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The impact of the US financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 has been global.  It was felt in output, trade, 
and  cross-border  capital  flows  and  transfers.  Incomes  have  dropped  and  consumption  patterns  are 
changing, placing at risk the human development gains of the 1990s.  At the heart of this global crisis is a 
credit crunch that has put financial strains on firms and individuals and has led to a large number of job 
losses and drops in income from other sources.   Having learned the lessons from past financial crises, 
some c ountries w ere w ell pr epared  and, w ith s upport f rom t he  international f inancial  community, 
lessened the impact of the crisis. Still, current estimates about the impact of the Crisis are staggering.  But  
country experiences show that in the past there have been huge overestimates of the impact on human 
development indicators that may be the case again now.  The high share of developing-country exports in 
total exports to advanced countries and the high number of women—pivotal in child development--in 
developing country-export sectors, make focusing on national and global actions conducive to restore 
world credit a priority for pol icymakers.  High  on t he action list is restoring credibility in financial 
markets,  making cr edit  accessible  to  small  businesses  that  account  for  a  large  share  of  employment 
globally,  strengthening t he a bsorptive c apacity of   public s pending, a nd e xpanding s ocial p rotection 
programs.  This paper is a compilation of selected literature on the impact of financial crisis on jobs, other 
sources of private income and public social spending and on human development. The paper uses the 
bank run and sudden stop framework of financial-crisis analysis, discusses country cases, and summarizes 
the lessons learned from current as well as past crises to prevent loosing sources of income.   
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The H uman D evelopment R esearch P aper ( HDRP) S eries i s a m edium  for s haring  recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not  necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 
 
I. Introduction 
Global progress in human development since the 1990s has been impressive.  In health, 
for example, there has been progress in maternal mortality, which dropped to around 343,000 in 
2008 from around 530,000 in 1980 in the 181 countries.
1 Higher incomes partially explain these 
outcomes by improving the nutritional status of women and more access, physically and 
financially to health care. Progress was particularly significant in Egypt, China, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia.   In education, the 2010 Education for All Global Monitoring Report
2
The global financial crisis (the Crisis) that unfolded in 2008 has lowered incomes and has 
led to changes in consumption patterns that are placing at risk those gains in human 
development.  The Crisis originated in the US, and its impact has been felt globally.  In 2009 
global output dropped 2.2 percent and the global unemployment rate increased to close to 7 
percent, the equivalent to having 35 million more people out of work (Figures 1 and 2).  An 
increase of 50 million in the number of the extreme poor is expected. 
 reports increasing 
numbers of children in school, reduction in gender gaps, and increasing numbers of children 
completing basic education (although the quality of education remains an issue).   
3
  Financial crises are not new to the global economy (Figure 3), and in some regions they 
 It is too soon to report on 
the impact on education and health, but, based on the experience of past crises, in some 
developing countries it is expected to be far from negligible, putting at risk the human 
development gains of the last decade.   
                                                           
1 Hogan et al. (2010).  
2 UNESCO (2010).  
3 World Bank (2010).  2 
 
have been recurrent.
4 In developing countries the combination of  banking and currency crisis 
(the so-called twin crises) has inevitably led to output collapses.
5    But even in successful 
attempts to weather a financial crisis,  output fell and fiscal adjustment, typically via public 
expenditures, in some cases led to a fall in social expenditures.  The impact of financial crises on 
human development indicators (HDI) has been extensively reported.
6
The Great Depression and financial crisis experiences in emerging markets provided 
lessons that have guided world policymakers in addressing the Crisis. The ultimate goal of this 
paper is to discuss the Crisis from the perspective of human development, to consider the lessons 
learned, and to assess the current policy challenges. After this introduction, Section II discusses 
channels of transmission; Section III addresses the development and impact of the Crisis; Section 
IV evaluates prospects; and Section V looks at lessons and policy challenges. 
 Financial crises increase 
poverty (Figure 4). However, the impact on health and education indicators has not been uniform 
across countries.  While in recent years there has been progress in protecting social expenditures 
from volatility and in establishing and improving the effectiveness of social protection programs, 
much remains to be done to ensure available resources are fully and efficiently disbursed and 
used.   
                                                           
4 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) review episodes of external defaults, inflation crises, currency 
crises, and banking crises in developed and developing countries since the 1800s.  
5 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).   
6 e.g., World Bank (2000), Ferreira and Schady (2008). 3 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth          Figure 2: World unemployment rates (%) 
                (%, quarter over quarter annualized) 
 
   
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2010               Source: ILO, Global Employment Trends, January 2010 
 
Figure 3. Percent of countries with at least one episode of financial crisis  
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
Figure 4: Poverty Headcount Before and After a Financial Crisis 
 
Source: Conceição,, Zhang, and Yanchun, 2009.  Note: The year of crisis is in the parenthesis. 
 
Table 1. Selected Crisis Episodes and Health Development Indicators 
 
Crisis Episode  Impact on Infant Mortality (IMR) and Malnutrition 
 
Peru, 1988-1992  IMR increased 2.5 percentage points for children born during the 
crisis 
Mexico 1994-1995  Mortality from anemia increased from 6.3 to 7.9 /100000 in 1993 
and 1995, respectively for children under age 1.  
Indonesia, 1997-98  IMR increased 3.5 percentage points in rural and urban areas.  
 
Cameroon, 1990s  Malnutrition for children under three years increased from 16  
(1991) to 23 percent (1998)  
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II. Financial Crises and Human Development Outcomes: What have we Learned? 
The term financial crisis has been broadly used to describe situations in which financial 
institutions or assets suddenly lose their value and national output drops significantly.  A 
characteristic of financial crises is a sudden change of investor sentiment with regard to the 
riskiness of investments, which leads to a sudden withdrawal of funds from financial institutions. 
This phenomenon, known as a “bank run” or “bank panic,” in turn leads to a drop in loanable 
funds and credit to the private sector.  Consequently, output collapses and private and public 
incomes also drop, leading to changes in spending and consumption patterns.   Poverty increased 
in past crises.  The direct impact on other aspects of human development is less clear.  Financial 
crisis can be particularly harmful to those least equipped to manage it, i.e., the poor. In terms of 
distributional outcomes, the evidence on a country-by-country level provides ambiguous results, 
largely due to measurement shortcomings. However, crisis-resolution strategies tend to be 
inequitable due to the unequal influences of poorly-managed by institutions.
7
     The number of countries which have had recurrent banking crises in a region has been 
high: 35 percent in Latin America; 13 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa; 11 percent in combined 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia; and 8 percent in East Asia and the Pacific.
  
8
                                                           
7 World Bank (2006).  
  There is no 
definitive explanation as to why Latin America is the region with the highest share of countries 
with recurrent crises.   Most studies attempt to associate this outcome with the poor growth 
performance of the region and this in turn with high growth volatility since the early 1800s 
8 IDB (2005) for the period 1974-2003.  There were no countries with recurrent financial crises 
the Middle East and North Africa and in high income countries.  See also Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009).  5 
 
fueled.
9   Although in this association causality remains uncertain, a recent study on Argentina
10
In this section we discussed channels of transmission after a brief discussion on the 
mechanics of financial crises. 
 
during 1971-2001 supports the endogeneity of growth volatility: external shocks but more 
importantly inconsistent domestic policies explain the recurrent crises there.  
II.1. The mechanics of financial crises. 
Sudden credit scarcity and the absence of a lender of last resort have characterized recent 
(and past) financial crises.  In both advanced and developing countries economic booms have 
typically preceded a financial crisis.  In developing countries these have been driven by external 
factors such as a surge in capital inflows and/or commodity prices and fast growth in the world’s 
largest economies.  During booms more bank financing at lower cost becomes available, relative 
prices change favoring the non-tradable sectors (e.g., real estate and commerce sectors), and 
higher loan collaterals lead to faster bank lending.  As a result, aggregate demand shoots up, and 
GDP growth accelerates.
11
                                                           
9It  is well known that since colonial times, in Latin America (a) economic inequality has been at 
the heart of many of the region’s political and social problems (particularly in endowment-rich 
economies); (b) the region has had many rapid inflation and default episodes (some involving 
creditor military interventions, e.g., Nicaragua and Venezuela); and (c) the region remains highly 
dependent on external factors, e.g., commodity prices, in other words, there has been little export 
diversification. Rodriguez (2001);  Frieden, Pator Jr., and Tomz (2000);  Edwards (2009); 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002).   Other sources of recurrent crises include higher terms of trade, 
real exchange rate and economic policy volatility (Sahay and Goyal (2006)), and lower regional 
productivity (IDB (2010A)) in relation to emerging Asian and advanced countries.   
  Current account balances deteriorate reflecting higher public and 
private sector external indebtedness, and international reserves can increase consistent with a 
10 Kaminsky, Mati, and Choueir (2010). 
11 The credit-growth causality has been discussed in economist circles extensively. Today there 
seems to be consensus that credit explains growth as shown in Mendoza and Terrones (2008).  6 
 
government strategy to accumulate them  to address balance of payment troubles and/or to 
maintain a depreciated currency and to maintain competitiveness.  
But not all is good news during bonanzas.  Reliance on short-term and foreign-currency 
borrowing makes emerging markets vulnerable to bank runs as significant liquid liabilities end 
up backed by illiquid assets and perceptions of real exchange rate misalignment mount (Chart 
1).
12
Chart 1. Boom-bust cycle in open economies 
   



















In low-income countries with limited formal financial intermediation and exposed to 
temporary commodity price shocks, e.g., low-income small African economies, vulnerability to 
                                                           
12 Calvo (2009).  Schularik and Taylor (2009) also show that over the past 140 years episodes of 
financial instability were often the result of "credit booms gone wrong." See also Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009). Reinhart and Reinhart (2006) catalog capital inflow bonanzas in both advanced 
and emerging markets during 1980-2007 for 181 countries and 1960-2007 for a subset of 66 
economies from all regions. 
Fiscal adjustment; income drops; poverty increase 
 
Output collapse; fire sales; lower tax revenue; higher foreign debt service; 
banking and public sector distress. Unsustainable levels of public debt 
 
Bank run; sudden credit crunch; drop in aggregate demand; drop in money 
demand; depreciation of the currency 
                         Negative external shock 
 
Aggregate demand boom; faster growth accompanied by poverty reduction. 
 
Deposit/Credit boom. Stronger currency. Higher private and public foreign 
currency indebtedness. 
 
Positive external shock (capital inflow surge and/or commodity price surge) 
 7 
 
capital outflows (i.e., capital flight) also exists. This typically arises from  the government’s 
inability to save a temporary windfall and to resort to money creation to close fiscal imbalances 
in the face of a sudden negative shock.
13   Not surprisingly, bonanzas have been associated with 
a higher probability of depositor runs on banks, debt defaults, and inflation.
14
In this context, as the economic literature suggests, even apparently small factors can lead 




  Emerging 
market examples of the 1990s include Mexico’s in 1994, Thailand’s in 1997, and Russia’s in 
1998.  As credit dries up, a contraction in expenditure accompanied by a real devaluation takes 
place, closing the deficit of the current account of the balance of payments.  But as collateral 
values drop, further credit contraction follows, lowering GDP growth and generating a deep 
recession. A bank run threatens the sustainability of the financial sector payment system. Hence, 
once the banking crisis has erupted and with no access to international capital markets, central 
bank liquidity injections could deepen the crisis further, leaving the economy insolvent and its 
financial and real sectors collapsed. Argentina’s 2001 crisis makes a good example of this 
scenario (Box 1).   
                                                           
13 Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Catherine Patillo (2004) and Collier (2007). 
14 Reinhart and Reinhart (2006).  
15 Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2008) for a review of currency crisis literature.   8 
 
 
Another common feature of recent financial crises is regional and global contagion, 
reflecting increased financial and commercial integration.  In virtually all the crisis episodes of 
the 1990s, there were incipient or full-fledged bank runs in economies other than in the source of 
the crisis.  In Bolivia, for example, Argentina’s financial crisis combined with domestic political 
instability led to capital outflows of about 6 percent of GDP in 2001-2002.
16  Also, contagion 
could be instantaneous or come with a lag, e.g., Central America in the mid-1990s.
17
At the heart of these systemic effects of financial crisis is the absence of a lender of last 
resort ready to inject liquidity when an incipient bank run occurs. In the cases of Russia and 
Argentina, no lender of last resort came forward. In the case of Mexico, the $50 billion 
Emergency Loan from the US contributed to preventing the breakdown of the financial sector 
system.  Emerging market experiences with boom-bust cycles--the so-called  sudden stop 
  
                                                           
16 Calvo (2006). 
17 Calvo and Reinhart (1996).   
Box 1. Sudden stop, financial crisis and poverty increase in Argentina 2001/02. 
 Like all emerging markets, during the 1990s Argentina enjoyed large capital inflows and fast growth. 
Throughout the 1990s, the macroeconomic framework compared favorably with countries renowned for 
their fiscal behavior, e.g., Euro countries. Contagion from Mexico’s crisis in 1994/5 brought fast growth to 
halt, but the economy recovered quickly and with a sounder financial sector.  As the Russian crisis of 1998 
froze international capital markets, risk premiums in emerging markets rose, but they rose far  more in 
Argentina reflecting expectations of devaluation of the currency and the concomitant deterioration of public 
finances.  Growth decelerated. To promote faster growth, in March, 2001, the central bank injected liquidity 
into the economy leading to deposit withdrawals and international reserve losses. By December 2001 bank 
deposits had dropped 18 percent; international reserves had fallen to less than half their January level; and 
the spread on government bonds had jumped almost five times to 4435 points.  To prevent a collapse in the 
financial sector’s payment system, bank customers were not allowed to withdraw deposits (the so called 
corralito measure). As foreign reserves continued to plummet, the peso was devalued, bringing balance 
sheet problems in firms and individuals indebted in dollars but receiving income in pesos. A weaker peso 
together with higher interest rates and slower growth rendered the public debt unsustainable. Political 
constraints to adjust the fiscal accounts led the government to default on its debt.  Thus, at the heart of 
Argentina’s crisis was the impact of a sudden cut in capital flows in a context of dollar debts that reached 
unsustainable levels also as a result of the large devaluation needed to close the current account (Calvo, 
Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2004). 
As a result of the crisis, output and investment dropped 18.4 percent and 56 percent, respectively. 
Unemployment increased from 11.7 percent to 15.9 percent during 2001/2. Poverty as traditionally 
measured increased from 38 percent in 2001 to 53 percent in late 2002.   9 
 
episodes--have been costly in terms of investment drops and government rescue packages (Table 
2).
18
Table 2. Output, Investment Contraction, and Rescue Packages 
  









Source: Calvo and Reinhart (2000). NA: not available.  
 
In view of these experiences, the economic profession remains divided regarding the 
benefit of openness in  developing countries.
  19    Poorly-managed economic bonanzas in 
economies with poor regulatory frameworks and supervision lead to vulnerability to costly 
financial crisis, as discussed in Section II.1.  Empirical studies, however, provide ambiguous 
results about the impact of financial  integration in developing countries.  Could more (as 
opposed to less) regulation promote sustainable growth in financially  integrated  economies?  
Some policymakers (e.g., Brazil’s) and more recently the IMF believe that capital controls on 
inflows could help, even though empirical studies provide ambiguous conclusions regarding their 
potential effectiveness.
  20
                                                           
18 Analyzing the behavior of 32 developed and developing countries, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia 
(2004) found that the probability of a sudden stop episode is higher the more closed to 
international trade and the higher foreign currency debts are.  Episodes of growth acceleration 
followed by growth deceleration have also been discussed in Hausmann, Rodriguez and Wagner 
(2006).  
  Capital controls on inflows do not prevent capital outflows of 
19 Box 3.5 in World Bank (2010). 
20 Ostry et al. (2010). 





 % of GDP 
35 Output collapses in 
developing countries 
Mean: -9.9  Mean: 42.2  NA 
Indonesia, 1997  -13  -39  18.1 
Korea, 1997  -7  -31  11.7 
Mexico, 1995  -6  -35  13.5 
Morocco, 1994  -7  -25  NA 
Russia, 1998  -5  -44  5.8 
Thailand 1997  -12  -62  12.1 10 
 
resources already in the financial system.
21  In many countries bonanzas have yielded improved 
HDI--albeit temporarily--which suggests that the issue is not whether to integrate or not but 
when and how to do so (including actions to protect expected human development gains).  For 
example, countries that trade less are more prone to sudden stops and currency crisis: closing the 
current account will require higher real exchange depreciation and, accordingly, self-fulfilling 
expectations of it may lead to a bank run in economies that trade little.
22  This conclusion 
provides support for trade openness and is consistent with the conclusions that bubbles may be 
socially efficient once the costs and benefits of financial deregulation that spurs temporarily high 
growth that then collapse  are weighed.
23  While there is no consensus regarding appropriate 
financial sector regulations for advanced and developing countries, there is agreement on the 
need to introduce reforms to regulate and supervise financial systems better in order to improve 
welfare across societies and prevent financial crises.
24
II.2. Channels of Transmission 
   
Financial crises across the globe during the last decade have provided significant 
information on the impact on human development.  The outcomes on health and education have 
not been uniformed across countries.  In rich economies no deterioration has been identified in 
either indicator.  Well-functioning credit markets, well-established social protection programs, 
and a low opportunity-cost of attending school explain this outcome.  In developing countries 
health indicators unambiguously deteriorates but only in low-income countries school enrollment 
deteriorates unambiguously.  School enrollment has increased in places where families chose to 
                                                           
21 Calvo (2010).  
22 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) and Cavallo and Frankel (2004), respectively.   
23 Calvo and Loo-Kung (2009).  
24 Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009). 11 
 
send their children to school because, as indicated, the opportunity-cost of doing so is low and/or 
the school offers social services such as provision of food.  The former was the situation, for 
example, in Peru in the late 1990s.  In contrast, annual growth in gross primary enrollment fell 
from 0.44 percent in 1994 to 0.09 percent in 1995 in Mexico and from 2.2 percent in 1993 to 0.8 
percent in 1996 in Argentina.
25
HDI improve during booms and deteriorate during downturns.
 
26  The increased allocation 
of private and public income to health and education appears to explain the improvement.   But 
there is heterogeneity of impact across the income level of countries, and human development 
losses during growth deceleration periods are higher than gains during booms.  Furthermore, 
human development losses during downturns could have long-lasting effects in places where 
little progress has been achieved during booms, for example, in poor economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
27
After a short discussion on the constraints to a deeper understanding of the financial 
crisis-human development links, this section elaborates on the  financial crisis-income link, 
highlighting the impact of financial crisis on jobs and the key role of small and medium 
enterprises as providers of a large number of jobs.     
 This could be quite serious in economies with recurrent output collapses and makes 
urgent the better understanding of the channels of transmission to design and implement social 
protection programs to protect the poor from economic shocks effectively.  
 
                                                           
25 Ferreira and Schady (2008). 
26 Conceição and Kim (2009) using a panel data with 200 countries for 1980-2006.   
27 Arbache, Sala and Page (2002).   12 
 
 2.1. Measurement shortcomings 
While these studies provide useful information, forecasting impact and extracting policy 
recommendations from them requires more country-specific knowledge.   Unfortunately, 
household surveys—the leading instrument used in human development research—still fall short 
of providing an accurate picture of household 
behavior when economic shocks hit.
28  For 
example, in the face of an economic shock, 
different families may decide to live under the 
same roof to reduce each one’s household 
spending.  Also, non-uniform economy-wide 
factors such as price stickiness and inflexible 
real wages may lead to a poor identification of 
the  determinants of human development 
outcomes.
29 The case of poverty in Indonesia in the late 1990s discussed in Box 2 illustrates 
these measurement shortcomings.  Furthermore, expenditure measures of well-being (used to 
calculate poverty) do not integrate the value of public services
30
Similarly, many studies based on cross-country regressions present methodological 
shortcomings that make regression analysis of limited use, for example, to identify causality.   
This type of analysis captures neither the efficiency effects nor the temporariness of benefits. 
Implicit in growth regressions is the assumption that the same model of growth is applied to all 
countries, and this may not be right. Linear growth regressions [typically used in growth 
 (Kanbur, 2010).  
                                                           
28 De Janvry and Sadoulet (2008) and Ravallion (2009).  
29 Behrman (2009). 
30 Kanbur (2010). 
Box 2. Overstated poverty impact. Indonesia in the 
late 1990s.  
 Output drop, devaluation of the currency, higher food 
prices, and annual inflation all led to the expectation of a 
huge increase in poverty in Indonesia as a consequence 
of the crisis in 1997.  Poverty did increase 50 percent, 
but the prediction had been  for  a fivefold increase.   
Thomas and Frankenberg (2007) attribute this poor 
forecast to three reasons: 1. per capita expenditures—
typically used to measure poverty—are hardly indicative 
of changes in well-being because household size and 
composition may change in response to the crisis; 2. 
households may just prefer to delay spending on 
semidurables, thus  reducing expenditure without 
affecting well-being; and 3. potential poor estimation of 
inflation rates which tend to be volatile in the aftermath 
of a financial crisis.  
 13 
 
research] “imply that the effect of increasing the value of the independent variable would be the 
same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variable.”
31  
Therefore, the same policy, e.g., a 10 percent tax increase, may not have the same effect in a 
poor country as in a rich country or in a country with weak institutions as in a country with 
strong institutions (more on this below).  Supplementing regression-based studies with more 




  Thus, while there is better understanding of the impact on household income 
and non-income resources, much remains to be learned about the channels of transmission from 
income to human development.  
2.2. The financial crisis-income-consumption link 
Lower consumption of quality food, medicine and public social services as a 




  Recalling the financial crises in East Asia in 1997-98, in Russia in 1998, 
and in Latin America since the early 1990s, this section illustrates the impact of these events on 
sources of income including labor markets, public services, and remittances. Discussing 
engagement with illegal activities and the impact of a drop in the value of financial assets is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
                                                           
31 Rodriguez (2008).  
32 Applications of the Growth Diagnostic Approach in growth analysis (Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco (2005)) have brought to the forefront the discussion on the utility of cross-country 
regressions (Rodrik (2005) and Rodriguez (2008)).   
33 World Bank (2000) and 2006).   14 
 
The labor market 
The labor market is an important channel of transmission of financial crises.  As output 
collapses, firms close or reduce production leading to higher unemployment. The speed of 
adjustment of the real sector depends on its production structure (e.g., a large and diversified 
export sector),
34
The situation could be particularly critical for workers in micro- and small and medium 
firms (SMEs) in both advanced and developing countries.  In the United States, SMEs account 
for about 50 percent  of total employment and account for about 60 percent of gross job 
creation.
  flexible labor costs, access to credit, and firm closure regulations (e.g., 
bankruptcy laws and the US’s Chapter 11-type of regulations) that provide resilience.  In the 
absence of these, surviving firms have typically resorted to strategies to reduce costs by, for 
example, moving to the informal sector.  Laid off workers migrate to sectors and/or countries 
with better employment prospects.  
35  In developing countries SMEs account for an average of 65 percent of total 
employment.
36 In Bolivia, for example, microfirms receiving microcredit were affected by the 
economic shocks of 2001/02.
37
                                                           
34 Hausmann, Rodriguez and Wagner (2008) and Calvo, Talvi and Mejia (2008).  
  In Chile the impact of the 1997/8 East Asia and Russian crises 
led many small firms to use non-bank financing, e.g., retained earnings, and thus to sacrifice 
investment, as large firms—unable to access external financing and perceived more 
creditworthy—crowded out domestic bank financing for SMEs.  In Chile, employment in SMEs 
and microfirms accounts for about 75 percent of total employment. Absence of credit, inflexible 
wages, and high firing costs led many SMEs to reduce the number of employees and hence to 
35 Bernanke (2010).  
36 Beck, Dermirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2010).  
37 Gonzalez-Vega and Rodriguez-Mesa, 2002. 15 
 
become microenterprises or to file for bankruptcy.  In the late 1990s unemployment increased 
from 6 percent to 11 percent.  Going back to pre-crisis unemployment rates took time.
38 In Latin 
American economies labor and credit inflexibilities have been identified as constraints to fast job 
recovery.
39
Displacement of workers to informal activities has featured in past crises. Indeed, in 
Latin America recurrent financial crises have gradually led to increases in informality. For 
example, urban salaried informality increased in Argentina from 1992 to 2003 by around 9 
percentage points and by 17 percentage points in Greater Buenos Aires from 1980-2003.
  
40 These 
workers are typically not covered by social protection. In East Asia displacement of workers 
took the form of migration to the agriculture sector.  About 30 to 40 percent of urban workers 
moved to the agriculture sector.
41
 
 In Korea, unemployment increased from 2.6 to 6.8 percent in 
1998 but achieved pre-crisis rates quickly as currency devaluations reduced the real wage.  In 
Indonesia fewer working hours helped to prevent further increases in unemployment. So did 
sustained availability of microcredit. 
Public sector social expenditures 
Public sector social expenditures have suffered during past crises in several developing 
countries.  The need to close the fiscal deficit in the face of lower tax revenues and increased 
                                                           
38 IDB (2006) and World Bank (2005).  
39 Caballero, Engel and Micco (2004).  
40 Perry et al. (2007). 
41 World Bank (2009a). 16 
 
public debt service has typically led to cuts in social expenditures.
42 For example, one common 
practice has been reducing the investment portion of government education and health budgets.  
In education public investment dropped 50 percent during 1987-1990 in Peru.  Typically, cuts in 
social investment in developing countries have been the result of social pressures to sustain the 
salary portion of these  budgets.
43  Teacher salaries can be counted as investment in human 
capital; however, the quality of teaching in many developing countries is being questioned.  In 
Latin America salaries in education have shown the most anticyclical behavior reflecting the 
strong presence of teacher unions.
44
World public financing of health by governments and development assistance sources (in 
constant US dollars) increased by nearly 100 percent from 1995 to 2006, as shown in Figures 5 
and 6 using IMF data (consistent with WHO data).
 On the other hand, attempts to better allocate education 
expenditures biased toward tertiary education and the rich have proved virtually impossible.  In 
this region the volatility of public expenditures has been associated with macroeconomic 
volatility and the need for recurrent episodes of fiscal adjustments (CAF, 2008).   
45
                                                           
42 Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vègh (2004) for emerging markets during 1965-2003. It has not been 
the case for OECD countries.  CAF (2008) and Ravallion (2008) for the prociclicality of social 
expenditures.   
  Domestic resources have been larger than 
development assistance.  Aggregate data do not tell the whole story, however.  In many 
economies health public expenditures have been pro-cyclical. In Thailand public investment in 
health  fell 30 percent from 1995  to 99.  However, breaking with past practices, Argentina 
effectively prioritized health spending despite the fiscal adjustment that the crisis of 2001 
43 World Bank (2009b). 
44  IDB (2009); World Bank (2004) 
45 The authors, although confident on the study result, acknowledge incomplete data sources in 
some countries.  17 
 
required.
46  Nevertheless, health outcomes suffered, partly due to the sudden increase in the cost 
of imported inputs, e.g., drugs, as a result of the large devaluation.  Evidence on donor responses 
in recent past crises (i.e., without the involvement of advanced countries) remains mixed (Lewis 
and Verhoeven, 2010).  In crisis episodes involving advanced countries, aid flows have been 
positively associated with the behavior of growth in advanced countries from 1997 to 2007).
47
While  sustained social expenditure is necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure good 
outcomes.  Efficient spending is also necessary. To achieve this several social programs have 
been established in developing countries, some more effective than others. The common features 
of these programs are “accountability between policymakers, providers and citizens” (World 
Bank 2003) and these programs’ ability to address short-term objectives while contributing to the 
achievement of long-term goals.  Examples include Bangladesh’s Food-for Education, Brazil’s 
Bolsa Escola, and Mexico’s Progresa. In fact, the city of New York is considering establishing 
its own Progresa.  These so-called cash (or food) transfer programs have been a source of income 
(and non-income services) for the poor, somewhat compensating for their inability to procure 
credit to smooth out consumption during the bad times.  
   
                                                           
46 World Bank (2009b).   
47 Dang, Knack and Rogers (2009) cited in Lewis and Verhoeven (2010). 
Figure 5. Government Health Expenditures              Figure 6. Development Assistance 
   
Source: Reproduced from Lewis and Verhoeven (2010). Data:  Lu et al. (2010).   18 
 
Remittances 
 Remittances are an 
important  source of income and 
hence of poverty reduction.
48 The 
phenomenal  global increase in 
worker remittances since 2004 
was associated with the bonanza 




  For example, fast growth in Russia’s construction sector was an 
important source of remittances in some CIS economies, reaching between 50 and 30 percent of 
GDP (Figure 7).  Remittances have been the driving force of GDP and tax revenue growth in 
these economies. Slower global and regional growth associated with the Crisis has lowered 
demand for migrant labor, in particular for hard-hit sectors such as construction. For example, 
formal remittances to Tajikistan fell 36 percent year-on-year in the first five months of 2009. 
III. The Crisis: Causes and Impact 
       The Crisis has increased the number of unemployed people by 34 million.
50
 
  Recovery has 
started,  and 2010 growth prospects for advanced economies and the developing world are 
generally good (with some exceptions).  However, recovery is expected to be slow, particularly 
in labor markets.  This section primarily discusses impact on incomes.  It starts with a discussion 
of the sources of the Crisis and its impact on output.  
                                                           
48 Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre (2010). 
49 E.g. UNDP (2009a).  
50 ILO (2010).  
Figure 7. Remittances in selected countries, % of GDP, 2008 
 
     Source: World Bank (2009c)  






III.1 The root sources of the crisis and official responses 
Consensus has gradually been reached regarding the root sources of the crisis:
  51
In a context of low lending standards, i.e., poor supervision and regulatory framework, 
long-term projects such as real estate investment were financed with short-term deposits that 
could be withdrawn at short notice, making financial institutions vulnerable to bank runs and 
thus laying the foundations for the Crisis and for its spread to world capital markets. In this 
regard the Crisis fits within the emerging-market type of financial crises.
  A 
combination of large capital inflows, low interest in the US,  and new short-term maturity 
instruments in the US banking industry that made cheap credit available. Capital inflows surged 
as investors felt that the US was a safer place to invest.  Emerging market governments were 
significantly represented among these  investors.  They  had accumulated huge international 
reserves during the commodity boom and capital inflow surge to protect their financial systems 
from sudden stops and to attempt to weaken appreciating pressures on the real exchange rate. 
They also feared further dollar devaluation as a result of lower interest rates in the US.  
52
Accordingly, as discussed in Section I, it was hard to identify what triggered the Crisis.  
Increasing mortgage defaults since early-2007 led a large drop in the stock market capitalization 
 The Crisis started in a 
segment of and quickly spread to the whole mortgage market, eventually infecting financial 
institutions and threatening a major economic shock.  The fast change of investor sentiment in 
mid-2008 is reflected in the Standard & Poor’s Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
Volaility Index—a key barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility based on 
information conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices (Figure 8).   
                                                           
51 E.g., Burnemeister (2008); Calvo (2009a). 
52 Calvo (2009b). Calvo (2009c) points to the sudden stop in the flow of credit (as opposed to a 
sudden stop in capital inflows) as domestic financial institutions were reluctant to lend.  20 
 
of major banks and a cessation of inter-money markets lending. Meanwhile, as off-balance-sheet 
maturity mismatches began to surface and no credit was available, many hedge funds suffered 
large losses, triggering margin calls and fire sales across the globe.  In September 2008 the news 
That Lehman Brothers and others were not going to be rescued by the government led to deposit 
withdrawals globally. The role of lender of last resort, adopted by advanced governments a 
month later, stopped the bank runs. Nevertheless, world credit decelerated (Figure 9) and global 
output contracted by 2.2 percent in 2009.  
 
The US mortgage crisis quickly spread around the world.  As credit dried up, global 
output, commodity prices, global trade, and remittances dropped.  Financial contagion has been 
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attributed to the risky liability structure of banks, which highlights the need to address related 
regulatory issues and financial openness.
53 The impact of the Crisis on countries with lower 
global financial ties, e.g., low-income countries, was felt through lower remittances from 
workers working abroad and through lower demand for their exports by advanced economies. A 
recent study argues that more trade diversification could have protected countries better arguing 
that “the possibility of international risk sharing through insurance schemes implicit in joint 
ventures, international lending, production diversification, and formal insurance contracts is 
greater in an open economy.“ 
54  However, the benefits of export diversification in a global credit 
crisis like the Crisis are likely to be limited.  It is worth highlighting that those economies with a 
higher share of food and other commodities (as opposed to a higher share of manufacturing) in 
total exports have showed to be more resilient to growth decelerations in a crisis context, 
highlighting the key role of credit in sustaining production.
55
 
  The implicit assumption here is 
that the manufacturing sector is more credit intensive than the commodity sectors.  
Official responses.   
The recognition of the central role of credit in the propagation of a financial crisis to the 
real sector and the lessons of the Great Depression prompted governments and the international 
financial community to intervene in the form of liquidity injections to prevent a credit crunch 
and output collapse.  The conventional view regarding the duration of the Great Depression is 
that policymakers allowed credit to shrink, leading to the collapse of the banking system and a 
damaging and protracted recession. Likewise, the slow growth of Japan of the 1990s has been 
                                                           
53 Raddatz (2010).  
54 Haddad, Lim and Saborowski  (2010).  
55 Berkmen, Gelos, Rennback and Walsh (2010). 22 
 
attributed to unresolved banking and corporate sector fragilities that surfaced when house and 
equity prices collapsed.  In emerging markets, the East Asian and Russian crises in the late 1990s 
as well as Argentina’s in 2001 provided important lessons, preparing policymakers there and in 
advanced countries to manage the Crisis better.  While the bonanza that preceded the Crisis had 
something to do with this, it also allowed many emerging market governments (e.g., East Asian 
countries and Chile) to be prepared for a potential financial crisis originating at home or abroad.   
Thus, the first line of attack to deal with the Crisis around the world was to stop bank 
runs. This was achieved by a combination of liquidity injections and an increase in bank deposit 
guarantees.   Other actions aimed at restoring the credit channel included purchase of assets and 
lending by national treasuries. Through different mechanisms liquidity was injected into the 
private sector, reducing uncertainty and systemic risk in financial markets and allowing 
vulnerable firms to continue operating while accessing schemes (e.g., Chapter 11 in the US) to 
prevent widespread bankruptcies.  At the international level the US, as lender of last resort, made 
liquidity available to selected countries (e.g., Brazil, Korea, Mexico, and Singapore), also aiming 
to prevent major real sector disruptions.  Likewise, in 2008 Japan provided liquidity swaps to 
Indonesia and India.  In parallel the IMF launched a short-term liquidity facility (SLF). In April 
2009 the G-20 increased IMF resources, leading to a new IMF facility, the Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL) to assist countries with sound policies facing liquidity constraints unconditionally and at 
longer maturities.  In developing countries public banks became the channels for allocating 
public resources to both public enterprises and the private sector.  23 
 
In parallel fiscal stimulus packages were implemented in both advanced and developing 
countries.
56
 However, the announced and the delivered stimuli have been different in different 
places. For example, in Korea only half the planned stimulus was delivered, whereas in 
Singapore it was fully delivered.
 Fiscal stimuli took several forms, including tax cuts targeted to small and medium 
enterprises (e.g., Brazil, China, Mexico, India, and Japan) and increased public spending, largely 
on labor-intensive infrastructure projects (e.g., the US and Germany and Argentina, Chile, China, 
Mexico, and Pakistan) but also in some cases to bring forward planned expenditures (e.g., 
China).  In the US, for example, infrastructure spending took the form of “greening” or “climate 
friendly” efforts.   Economies with fiscal space, mostly middle-income countries, targeted 
spending to the social sectors (e.g., Chile).  
57  One of the cited causes of the shortfall has been 
implementation bottleneck. Although difficult to measure,
58 stimulus packages associated with 
the Crisis so far have been much smaller than rescue packages in emerging markets in the late 
1990s (Tables 2 and 4). A recent study indicates that the US stimulus package reached 6 per cent 
of and China’s at 13 per cent of  2008 GDP, which make these closer to past rescue packages.
59
                                                           
56 Paci, Ravenga, and Rijkers (2009).   
  
All the 35 fiscal packages reviewed in this study have a social protection component amounting 
to about 25 percent of 2008 global GDP.  South Africa (56 percent), Singapore (52 percent), 
Taiwan (47 percent), and Finland (43 percent) have the largest allocations for social protection.  
In Peru, Mexico, Israel, Chile, and Turkey this allocation amounted to an average of around 4 
57 The World Bank has produced several reports describing the impact of the Crisis regionally, 
e.g., (2009d) and (2009e).  
58 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
59 Zhang, Thelen and Rao (2010). 24 
 
percent, perhaps consistent with the limited impact the Crisis had on these countries and/or the 













Preliminary data suggest that stimulus packages have been effective. The March 2010 
data on employment in the US indicate that unemployment continues increasing but at a slower 
pace and that some employment recovery has taken place.
60
                                                           
60 Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010).  
 An important topic of debate is the 
long-run effect of fiscal stimuli on the soundness of public finances. Undoubtedly, government 
intervention has resulted in larger budget deficits and debt (Figure 10), threatening fiscal 
sustainability, i.e., the ability of a country to pay its debts, particularly in economies with little 
fiscal space.  Sinn (2009) estimates that the percentage increases in budget deficits in the UK, 
OECD, and the Eurozone were 10.2, 4.5, and 3.7 respectively.  Furthermore, a high level of 
domestic currency debt in developed countries, e.g., the US, could lead to higher inflation rates 
to reduce the real value of the debt. This would lead to higher interest rates on developing 
countries’ external debt and stronger deterioration of their fiscal accounts, repeating the 
Table 4. Selected Fiscal Stimuli, Advanced Countries, 2008-2009  
  Eurozone  G-20  US  Japan  UK 
Fiscal 
Stimulus,  % 
of GDP* 






3.7  OECD  4.3  5.1  7.3 
4.5 
Sources: * World Bank (2009d); **Sinn (2009).  25 
 
“Volcker” increase in interest rates of the 1970s that led to the debt crisis in the developing 
world at that time.  
 
The Management of the Crisis vis-à-vis the 1997/1998 East Asian and Russian Crises. 
In contrast to the 1997/8 international financial crises, the origin of the Crisis was in an 
advanced country, i.e., the US, and contagion hit both developing countries and other advanced 
countries. The channels were financial markets as in the late 1990s but also private transfers 
(e.g., remittances) and trade in goods and services. In low-income countries contagion was 
primarily through the trade channel. Associated with a drop in global output and trade was a drop 
in commodity prices.   
 How does the management of the Crisis on emerging markets compare with that of the 
1998 Russian financial crisis? This time around emerging markets were able to use monetary and 
countercyclical fiscal policy, which was not an option when the East Asian and the Russian 
crises hit.  For example, during the Crisis international reserves financed much of the current 
account deficit in emerging markets.    Also,  in the large countries of LAC, lower liability 
Figure 10. Budget Balances, % of GDP 
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dollarization permitted devaluations within the 30 to 35 percent range. Impact of inflation was 
apparently negligible given global deflation.   
The combination of stronger fundamentals, continued access to international markets, and 
the US role as a lender of last resort allowed those types of official interventions. Stronger 
fundamentals were the result of the adequate management of the bonanza that preceded the 
Crisis and that led to surpluses in both the current account of the government and the balance of 
payments; lower total debt and foreign-currency denominated debt and short-term debt in total 
debt; and higher international reserves in both absolute values and as a back-up of short-term 
debt, lower ratios of short-term debt to total external debt (Figure 11), and in some countries 
accumulation of public savings.  
Figure 11. International Reserves and Short-Term Debt  
  Total International Reserves                                     Short-Term Debt ( % of total                            
































Source: IMF (2010a) 27 
 
Also, despite major disruptions in advanced-economy capital markets, capital inflows to 
emerging markets were sustained, although at a lower rate, and there were no major disruptions 
in short-term debt financing as  in previous crises, e.g., Turkey’s.  Neither did any major 
disruption occur in the Central and Eastern Europe region where the Baltic economies showed 
weaknesses similar to pre-Russia 1998 emerging market vulnerabilities.    The availability of 
multilateral resources for economies with good fundamentals, i.e., the IMF’s FCL, gave the clear 
signal that the international community was ready to provide financial support to emerging 
markets facing liquidity problems. This context contrasted completely with that of the late 1990s, 
when international capital markets suddenly closed for emerging markets and there was no 
effective lender of last resort,  leading in some cases to full-fledged financial crises (e.g., 
Argentina 2002).  However, some emerging markets chose not to save the commodity bonanza. 
For example, Argentina and Venezuela are presently facing public sector financing problems, as 
international capital markets still remain closed for them.  Multilateral support has also been 





  Data to assess the impact of the Crisis are gradually emerging.   Credit and output 
decelerated globally and fell in some countries (Figures 1 and 6).  Consequently, oil and non-fuel 
commodity prices dropped 36.1 and 18.9 percent respectively in 2009.  No country was 
untouched.  But impact has not been uniform partly due to the initial conditions and the type of 
stimulus package implemented in each country.   Economies with higher growth rates were hit 
                                                           
61 Includes the seven major countries in the region, i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. IDB (2010).  28 
 
harder.
62 This is consistent with the behavior of private credit and the capital flows/commodity 
boom-credit link described in Section I.I.  In Latin America GDP growth turned negative with 
significant drops in Chile, Peru, and Mexico.  In contrast, developing Asia, driven by China and 
India, sustained high positive albeit slower growth. Africa sustained positive growth, but this 
dropped significantly from 5.2 percent in 2008 to 1.9 in 2009.  In advanced economies the annual 
growth rate fell 5.9 percentage points to – 3.2 percent in 2009.  In the US, “one measure of 
bank’s loans to small businesses dropped from more than $710 billion in the second quarter of 
2008 to less than $670 billion in the first quarter of 2010.
63
As credit, commodity prices,  and global output dropped,  so did global trade  and 
remittances.
  Three factors appear to have 
contributed to this outcome, namely weaker demand for loans (partly due to a drop in the value 
of collaterals), deterioration in the financial conditions of small businesses, and limited credit 
availability.   
64 Preliminary data indicate that the volume of world trade in goods and services and 
remittances dropped by 14.4 and 6 percent respectively in 2009. The drop in trade would have 
been almost twice as large had the cost of credit (reflected in interbank rates) remained at the 
high levels of September 2008.
65 Remittances in Africa fell by 4 to 8 percent, hitting countries 
such as Lesotho where accounts for 25 percent of GDP (Figure 7) and about 25 percent of the 
income of the poor, respectively.
66
                                                           
62 Mody (2010). 
 In Moldova, with 2008 remittances at 40 percent of GDP, the 
63 Bernanke (2010).  
64 World Bank (2009e and d). 
65 Chor and Manova(2010). 
66 World Bank, Africa Region website. 29 
 
drop was about 34 percent in the second quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier.
67  FDI also 
suffered. Global FDI dropped 39 percent in 2009. All components, equity capital, reinvested 
earnings, and other capital flows, were affected.  However, the decrease was especially marked 
for equity capital flows, which are most directly related to transnational long-term investment 
strategies.  FDI in commodity sectors had been important in Africa in recent years.  In 2008 this 
represented 29 % of capital formation.
68
The impact on consumption has been far from negligible. For example, in Armenia about 
43 percent of the surveyed households reduced food consumption, reduced or stopped buying 
medicines, and reduced or stopped visits to health services. In Turkey, where 91 percent of the 
poorest 20 percent of households lost income, 53 percent of surveyed households reduced food 
consumption,  and about 21 percent reduced visits to health services. “Among the poorest 
households, 75 percent have reduced children’s food consumption, 29 percent reduced health 
care use and 14 percent cut back on education spending.” 
   
69 These findings have heightened 
concerns about losing the health and education gains of the 1990s.  Protecting human 
development gains is critical. Globally, about 72 million primary-school-age children and 
another 71 million adolescents remain out of school, and it is expected that 56 million primary-
school-age children will continue be out of school in 2015.  Illiteracy remains at 759 million 
people, two-thirds of them women.
70
Drops in incomes have driven the changes in consumption patterns described above, 
making jobs (particularly in SMEs) a key economic shock/human development channel.  Also, 
   
                                                           
67 World Bank (2009f)).  
68 UNCTAD (2010).  
69 Lewis and Verhoeven (2009).   
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household actions related to human development typically are in the hands of women; hence, 
sustaining their well-being is imperative.  Availability and quality of social services are also 
likely to suffer as a result of the Crisis. A discussion on jobs, women, and public expenditure 
follows.  
2.1 Jobs  
The  impact  of the credit crunch of the Crisis  on jobs around the world  has been 
significant, particularly in the export, construction, and manufacturing sectors. Developed and 
European Union (EU) countries and Eastern European (non-EU) and CIS countries had the 
largest increases in unemployment (Table 5).    In Lithuania, for example, the annual 
unemployment rate increased close to 7 percentage points in the first quarter of 2009, reaching 
nearly 12 percent in 2009.
71 In India over 500,000 jobs in export-oriented sectors were lost in 
2008:3.
72 The impact was also felt in the mining sector, with South Africa eliminating 40,000 
jobs (amounting to 10 percent of the workforce in the sector) and Zambia eliminating 27 percent 
of total jobs in mining  in 2008.
73  Lower US demand for Cambodian exports led some 48 
factories to close there from September 2008 through May 2009.
74
After four consecutive years of decline, the associated global unemployment rate 
increased from 5.7 percent in 2007 to 6.6 percent in 2009 (Table 5). Developed economies and 
  About 30,000 jobs, 
amounting to about 10 percent of the labor force, were lost.  This in turn had an impact on the 
rural sector, where about 1.5 million people depend on remittances from migrant workers—
mostly women—in urban areas as their major source of income.  
                                                           
71 UNDP (2009).  
72 World Bank (2009g). 
73 Ndulo et. al (2009).   
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the European Union saw an increase of 2.3 percentage points. In the US the increase was 4 
percentage points, and in other advanced countries it hovered between 0.5 and 3 percentage 
points.   During 2008-2009, the highest increases in unemployment rates among EU countries, 
about 7.5 percentage points, occurred  in Ireland and Spain. In contrast, in Germany 
unemployment decreased half of a percentage point. Box 3 presents a good example of the 
behavior of firms from Eastern Europe with regard to sales, financing, and employment during 
2008 and 2009.  
Table 5. Regional Unemployment 
 
 Source: ILO (2010, Table A2). 
 
So far, output and unemployment have been affected differently across countries. While 
Ireland and Spain saw unemployment increase 7.5 percentage points, output dropped by more 
than 8 percent in Ireland but only by approximately 4 percent in Spain.  Germany was able to 
decrease unemployment even though output dropped 7 percent (2009). Output declines, 
institutional differences, the characteristics of the Crisis (e.g., the construction sector collapse), 32 
 
and policy response differences (e.g., short-time work programs in Germany, Italy and Japan) 
explain this variety of responses.
75
With respect to gender, male unemployment in developed economies rose faster in 2008 
(1.1 percentage points for men versus 0.8 points for women). In South Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa, the female unemployment increased more 
than that for males.   
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Measures to mitigate the impact of the Crisis on jobs were implemented around the 
world. The UK, Australia, and Chile provided hiring subsidies. Germany reduced working hours 
to prevent layoffs. The US, Brazil, and OECD countries extended unemployment benefits. 
Mexico, for example, has in place the Job Training Program for Unemployed Workers 
(PROBECAT) which has proven effective in providing private (as opposed to public) on-the job 
Box 3. The behavior of firms.  
Eastern Europe and Central Asia are the regions that were hardest hit. Unemployment there is expected to reach 
10.3 percent in 2010 (Table 5).  Surveys of firms from those regions provide good information about the impact of the 
Crisis on labor. Some background first:  Capital inflows in the form of foreign bank resources to Eastern Europe 
increased five times during 2003-2004:3.  This in turn led to a fast increase in domestic bank credit in both domestic and 
foreign currency.  The Crisis brought a sudden credit crunch, leaving domestic firms and households highly indebted, 
many of them with debt denominated in foreign currency.  The threat of major devaluations and output collapses in 
these countries and of major financing troubles in the banking system of the countries that provided the loans (e.g. 
Norway, Sweden, and Austria), led the world to provide financing resources to avert a full-fledged crisis.  Nevertheless, 
the impact of the sudden deceleration and drop in credit was felt in the real sector.  Table 6 shows the impact of the 
Crisis on firms in some of these countries.    
The behavior of firms was not uniform across countries. In Bulgaria both permanent and temporary 
employment dropped. In Hungary temporary workers suffered, whereas in Latvia the increase in temporary workers was 
at the expense of permanent workers.  Clearly, sales in the export and the construction sectors dropped, but  they 
increased in sectors producing goods for the domestic market such as food and textiles.   This is consistent with the 
framework of analysis described in Section II.1. Firms delayed payments to financial institutions and increased used of 
non-bank financing for working capital, and workers, particularly those hired for temporary tasks, lost their jobs. Debt 
increased, making firms vulnerable to roll-over and foreign-exchange risk.  Full-time employment of skill-intensive 
enterprises dropped in all countries except Hungary.  
 
Table 6.Firm Survey Results. Central and Eastern Europe 
 












% of firms*  
Non-bank 
financing, % of 
firms**   
Corporate sector 
debt., % of total 
debt 















Bulgaria  21  35  23  52  84  49  21  - 4.6  - 6.8 
Hungary  11  25  66  26  51  69  35  1.2  - 5.3 
Latvia  33  48  63  50  73  49  39  - 18  54.9 
Lithuania  18  47  48  40  51  80  21  0.0  23.8 
Romania  14  36  9  58  65  57  31  2.6  - 13.5 
 
Source:  Correa and Iotty (2010).  *Percent of firms overdue on obligations to financial institutions in  total firms that have 
restructured their outstanding liabilities in the last 12 months. **Percent of firms that use internal funds or retained earnings to finance 
100 percent of working capital. *** Debt with maturity of less than a year in total debt. 34 
 





Women are particularly vulnerable to economic shocks, and addressing this is critical for 
human development.  A key factor in human development is women’s role as child caretakers.  
Women are typically responsible for feeding children and facilitating access to health and 
education.  Also, the health of newborn children—critical for cognitive development—is directly 
related to their mothers’ health.  Iodine deficiency and anemia during pregnancy as well as 
absence of skilled health personnel during delivery could leave children facing lifetime 
disadvantages.
77
  Of the 3 billion employed around the world in 2008, 1.2 billion were women (40.4 
percent).  Female unemployment is likely to be impacted by the Crisis as well as men’s, as 
discussed.  But aggregate figures do not provide the whole picture.   Women’s employment in 
export-oriented industries has increased significantly in recent decades.  In Uganda, for example, 
the cut flower industry employs a workforce that is 85 percent female. In Kenya, where cut 
flowers are the second largest agricultural export, 70 percent of workers are women.  Women are 
also well represented in the textile export sectors in Kenya, Lesotho, and Thailand.
  A drop in household income implies lower consumption for the whole family, 
poorer health, and less education.   
78  As global 
trade has decelerated, layoffs involving women in the export sectors have been significant.
79
                                                           
76 World Bank (2009a). 
 
Self-employed women in the Indian garment sector have seen their monthly earnings fall by 50 
77 UNESCO (2010).  
78 World Bank (2009f). 
79 ILO (2010).  35 
 
percent and days of work reduced by 69 percent since November 2008.  The reduction of 
remittances in Vietnam as a consequence of the Crisis has made women migrant workers poorer.  
To cope with the crisis, many Vietnamese women have moved to the informal sectors, others are 
relying on community-based assistance.
80
An increase in domestic violence toward women as a result of poorer economic 
conditions has also been identified in past.  The increased vulnerability of women’s well-being 
due to the Crisis makes it imperative to continue addressing its short-term impact, i.e., reducing 
unemployment due to a credit crunch and aiming at sustaining jobs for both men and women 
while strengthening social protection programs.  
  
2.3 Public spending  
The impact of the Crisis on public spending in the social sectors has been mixed.
81
                                                           
80 Nguanbanchong (2010).  
 In 
some countries, in contrast with the crisis experiences of the 1990s, social spending did not 
change, e.g., Brazil, Chile, and Peru. In others it increased. Mexico, which was hard hit by the 
Crisis, increased funding for education by about 10 percent (Figure 13).  Social spending 
increases took place even in economies with significant drops in output in 2008-9, e.g., Romania, 
Latvia, and Lithuania.  In fact, the Crisis has facilitated the introduction of reforms in Latvia, and 
Romania introduced reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of education and health spending 
that proved difficult to implement.  In Armenia there have been cuts in education spending, too, 
amounting to 11 percent for the lowest income households.  The Ukraine increased minimum 
wages and public sector employment. However, this could be an expensive intervention with 
limited impact on the poor—public employees typically are not among the poor group—and, 
81 Lewis and Verhoeven (2010).   36 
 
once implemented, increased minimum wages and public sector employment are virtually 

















In light of the global nature of the Crisis, in all low-income countries there have been 
concerns about lower donor funding.  This has increased significantly in recent years, making 
social sectors highly dependent on this type of resource.  For example, in Rwanda donor funding 
represents about 50 percent of the total government budget for the health sector and nearly 100 
percent of the total public health budget.
82
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 However, new estimates indicate that there has been 
Figure 13.  Education and Health Social Expenditures, 2005-2009 
Mexico 
                        
Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Mexico 
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continued growth in development aid in 2009.
83
A key challenge for donor grants is to increase the speed of disbursement.  For example, 
the Global Fund disburses quickly once allocations are decided, but spending in the target 
country is slow.  About half of the allocation of Global Fund resources for HIV/AIDS remains 
undisbursed.  This is particularly acute in Sub-Saharan Africa, where disbursement has only been 
about 45 per cent.  For example, Global Fund funding for HIV/AIDS increased during 2008-
2009, but a large share of that remains undisbursed.  This is also a concern about government 
spending.  
 More specifically, total net official development 
assistance (ODA) from donors in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee rose 0.7 
percent in real terms or 6.8 percent once debt relief is excluded.  Significant increases came from 
Denmark, Sweden, and the United States.  The increase from the US was 5.4 percent in real 
terms over 2008.  Most countries have maintained their commitments for 2010; others, including 
some large donors, have reduced or postponed the pledges they made for 2010, confirming 
expectations.  However, the IMF (2010) reports countries with Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers are expected to maintain social expenditures. 
 
IV. Prospects 
Preliminary projections are staggering.  The Crisis--compounded by a lingering food 
crisis that started in the mid-2000s--could bring hunger to an additional 100 million people, 
increasing  the overall number of undernourished to over one billion.
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83 OECD (2010).  
    People in extreme 
poverty could reach 114 million by the end of 2011 (relative to a non-crisis scenario) and there 
84 FAO (2009).  38 
 
could be up to 3050 additional infant deaths in 2009 in S-Saharan countries.
85  The number of 
unemployed women could increase by 22 million in 2009, increasing the global unemployment 
rate for women to 7.4 per cent.
86
Table 7. Consumption Growth % (2010 and 2011 are forecasts) 
 While rescue packages have stopped the Crisis from deepening, 
incomes will continue suffer where labor demand remains low and governments, firms, and 
individuals remain highly indebted and credit constrained. Consumption forecasts augur difficult 
times particularly for economies in recent years enjoyed high levels of consumption as capital 
flow in and/or commodity prices increased and were poorly prepared to cope with a shock, e.g., 
the Central and Eastern European countries (Table 7). 
  Hungary  Bulgaria  Croatia  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
2007  - 1.6  5.1  6.2  9.1  14.8  12 
2008  - 0.6  4.5  0.8  -4.8  -5.5  3.6 
2009  - 6.7  - 6.2  - 8.0  -17.4  - 22.4  - 17.0 
2010 
 
- 1.9  0.1  - 0.5  -3.8  - 7.5  - 5.0 
2011 
 
 1.6  1.9  2.6  2.2  1.6  2.1 
Source: Consensus Forecasts (March 2010) 
 
Recovery has started, and growth prospects in most countries are positive. Global output 
is expected to rise by about 4 percent in 2010 (Annex 1), largely driven by emerging Asia.  In the 
US there is evidence of stronger consumption that may help normalize global trade, FDI, and 
remittances.  But dark clouds are still lingering.  In some countries (e.g., China) this recovery 
appears to be driven by a buildup of inventories and hence may not be sustainable.  In the trade 
area, while faster growth in rich countries may lead to higher demand for developing-country 
                                                           
85 World Bank (2009) and Friedman and Schady (2009), respectively.  
86 ILO (2010). 39 
 
exports, implicit protectionism imbedded in stimulus packages promoting consumption of 
domestically-produced goods may have a negative impact.  Protectionism also appears to be 
increasing in developing countries (e.g., Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia).
87  In selected 
emerging markets (e.g., Brazil and Colombia) inflows of capital have resumed, appreciating the 
currencies and discouraging export production.
88 In the financial sector there are indications that 
banks remain reluctant to lend and more financial regulation is on the adjustment agenda.  Banks 
continue to tighten standards for loans to small businesses, while standards for large companies 
remain unchanged.
89
Macroeconomic policy decisions will also impact employment.  In light of expansionary 
packages, inflation may pick up and interest rates may go up, putting deceleration pressures on 
economic activity.  Fiscal accounts may deteriorate (partly as a result of rescue packages), 
threatening the ability of governments to pay their debts and to maintain their credibility.  These 
uncertainties and past crises experiences augur stubborn global unemployment.  It may take time 
for new employment opportunities to emerge.
  
90
  Commodity prices.   Over the  medium term, real commodity prices are expected to 
remain stable at 2010 levels--still higher than mid-2000 levels and closer to the behavior of the 
1970s  (Figure 14).
  
91
                                                           
87 Taylor and Wilson (2009).  
  As all, growth developments, the macroeconomy (reflected in volatile 
exchange rates and interest rates), financial-investor appetite in commodity markets, and the use 
88 Kiguel and Levy-Yeyati (2009). 
89 However,  fast recovery may take place without an associated bank credit increase as firms 
resort to informal credit markets and/or postpone investment plans as happened in emerging 
markets in the late 1990s (Calvo and Loo-Kung (2010) ) .  
90 IMF (2010b). 
91 World Bank (2010). 40 
 
of agriculture products as an alternative fuel source remain volatile; upward and downward 
pressures on commodity prices are expected to balance out   This situation that contrasts with 
that of the 1970s when markets were less volatile calls for continually addressing regulation on 
financial commodity markets.   
 Whether or not agriculture production, consumption, and trade increase in developing 
countries and produce more food for the world’s poor, access to food remains the most 
immediate concern.   In comparison with the 1970s, 
inventories are more adequate to respond to demand. 
For example, “the wheat stocks-to-use ratio in major 
exporting countries has risen from 12 percent in 
2007/8 to 20 percent this season.  On the demand 
side, biofuels remain a leading driver, but the year-on-
year growth has slowed down compared with the past 
few years. In the United States, the largest user of 
grains for biofuel production, the use of maize for ethanol has grown by 14 percent this season, 
down from 40 percent in the run-up of the high price period”(FAO (2010)).  
 The response to the food and fuel crisis in the mid-2000s largely comprised general 
subsidies in some countries and increasing taxes to contain its impact on domestic prices in 
others. Out of 146 countries surveyed by the IMF, only 39 expanded targeted safety nets, partly 
because not all countries (largely low-income) have safety nets in place and partly for political 
reasons.
92
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  Unfortunately, temporary price distortions have long-term effects and typically have 

























turned out to be permanent.   For example, export taxes and other price controls in the short term 
redistribute income away from producers (rural producers in the case of commodity producers) 
to richer consumers and in the medium term discourage investment (e.g., Argentina’s export tax 
on commodity exports).  Also, public stockpiles have proven costly and difficult to manage.  
 
 Slow employment recovery calls for sustained actions aimed at preventing job layoffs as 
well as promoting employment.  It also calls for the strengthening of social protection programs, 
for example, through direct cash transfers that aim at smoothing out consumption and thus 
preventing human development deterioration among the working poor.  Effective safety nets 
with a nutrition-driven component remain the first choice. Identifying those most vulnerable to 
the food crisis is urgent.  The food crisis of the mid-2000s has affected both consumers and 
producers.  For the poor in developing countries it was a negative shock, given the significant 
share of these commodities in their budgets.  A key policy issue is to identify who are the gainers 
and who are the losers in the event of high commodity prices.   This in turn depends on the 
degree of transmission of international prices into domestic prices.
93
 
    
V. Lessons and Challenges 
                                                           
93 De Janvry and Sadoulet (2009) in a welfare exercise for Guatemala stated that there was no 
statistically significant transmission of international into domestic prices.  Most real staple food 
prices rose but not significantly, as usually assumed, yielding small welfare effects.  However, 
given high food consumption share in farmer households, farmers of all sizes lost out from the 
rise in prices.  Only if international prices had fully transmitted would half of the large farmers 
have gained, with the vast majority of small and medium farmers losing out. “Allowing for price 
responses in both production and consumption mitigates negative effects, but still leaves a vast 
majority of the farmer population losing.” This study suggests that social protection should target 
both the rural and urban poor, contrary to the belief that the most affected group is the latter. 42 
 
The global financial crisis that unfolded in 2008 is the most severe global financial crisis 
since the Great Depression.  At the heart of this crisis has been a sudden credit crunch leading to 
a drop in global output,  trade, remittances, tourism,  and other sources of  employment and 
incomes.   Domestic liquidity injections and countercyclical policies and financial resources 
from rich countries and international financial institutions to developing countries all contributed 
to keeping economies going by protecting financial sector payment systems.  True, still many 
firms closed, millions remain out of work, and effective financial intermediation—key for the 
effective functioning of economies--remains impaired.  Gains in the reduction of poverty from 
the last decade may be lost particularly in low-income countries and in this scenario the threat of 
social unrest is real.  But, in contrast with past crises (including the Great Depression), these 
official interventions stopped the hemorrhaging virtually everywhere, preventing the crisis from 
deepening.  Economies with fiscal space implemented stimulus packages including additional 
resources for the social sectors.  Those with social protection programs in place were able to 
increase coverage.
94
The key short-term challenges policymakers face today include:  
 All these actions suggest that the lessons from the Great Depression and 
recent financial crises in emerging markets were learned!  It is, nonetheless, too soon to assess 
the impact of those measures on the most vulnerable.  
•  sustaining protection of the vulnerable population while ensuring the “new” poor—
those who before the crisis the bonanza lifted out of poverty-- are also reached;  
•  increasing the absorptive capacity of public spending  particularly in developing 
countries where it remains very low; 
                                                           
94  E.g., Mexico’s Progresa; the Philippines’s Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program; and 
Cambodia’s cash-and food for work. 43 
 
•  restoring confidence in financial systems that aim to sustain fully-functioning credit 
channels and thus protect employment.  In this regard, making credit accessible to 
sound small business remains a priority ; 
•   addressing inflationary pressures as a consequence of increased liquidity that could 
depreciate incomes further;  
•  maintaining an open international trade system both advanced and developing 
countries.   This should contribute sustain jobs particularly for women in developing 
countries.   In emerging markets trade openness have proven to help buffer the impact 
of sudden stops  in capital inflows;  
•  effectively implementing an exit strategy from fiscal stimuli  to ensure sustained 
employment while preventing stimuli from being perceived and becoming permanent. 
In  the current situation of vulnerable financial systems, depleting international 
reserves as fiscal stimuli are withdrawn will leave the economy vulnerable to future 
liquidity shocks;  
 
  As discussed in this paper, jobs and effective social spending is the  key to 
preventing the loss of the social gains of the 1990s and for the resumption of progress.  
The 2008-10 crisis has shown that shock preparedness pays.  In this regard, to buffer the 
impact of financial crises on human development the following lessons have been 
learned:  
 
•  to lessen economic adjustment when external financing becomes scarce, keep high 
international reserves and reserve and liquidity requirements to lower vulnerability 
to debt-rollover and currency risk.  Sound financial systems are no guarantee of 44 
 
output-collapse immunization.  External factors matter and cross-border contagion 
may strike any time.   
•  to avoid potentially regressive palliative measures during a crisis, build stronger 
regulatory and supervisory structures for the financial system and comprehensive 
insurance mechanisms during economic stability.  Politically, it may not be easy to 
implement such measures and to achieve more equitable outcomes once the crisis 
hits. This applies likewise to ex-ante insurance design—whether for depositors, 
bankruptcy, or unemployment.  Beyond equity considerations, crisis may not be the 
most appropriate time to implement constraints, e.g., higher bank loan provisions, in 
an already credit-constrained financial sector.  Putting bounds on financial regulation 
has typically turned difficult.  Wall Street is already searching for ways to bypass new 
regulations.
95
•  to allow firms to adjust fast, have  in place an  effective bankruptcy regulatory 
framework.  Credit alone is not likely to speed up job and output recovery.  Flexible 
labor markets are also needed. This however has proven difficult to achieve in the 
developing world, largely due to political economy considerations.  
 Controls on capital inflows do not guarantee containment of capital 
outflows.  Financial stocks already in the economy are as vulnerable to reversals as 
new capital inflows, which highlights the need to maintain a stable macroeconomic 
and social environment; 
•  to provide immediate social protection, have in place an efficient system of public 
sector delivery.   
                                                           






When the crisis unfolds,   
•  maintain a well-functioning payment system in the financial sector during economic 
crisis to the extent that credit matters for output and employment.  Credit is needed to 
keep the economy going and to prevent massive individual and firm bankruptcies, 
particularly in labor-intensive sectors, e.g., SMEs and microfirms.  In this regard 
efficient public banks may have an important role as financial intermediaries.  
•   rebalance the use of public resources to prevent human development losses.  In this 
regard Chile’s behavior has been exemplary: Chile’s bonanza of 2003/8 was saved 
despite strong pressures (including street protests) not to do so. Today Chile is 
financially and institutionally ready to address the Crisis as well as the recent massive 
earthquake it suffered.  Prioritizing expenditures becomes more important during 
economic crises; however, changing allocations may prove difficult and calls for 
efforts to be directed toward encouraging private-public partnerships. An additional 
challenge is to improve the ability of central and local governments from low-income 
countries to disburse available resources. This calls for more involvement of local 
communities in joint programs with governments;  
•  expand existing schemes to protect the most vulnerable.  Collecting data takes time; 
hence social programs created in the middle of a crisis are likely to be ineffective. 
The short-term challenge in the social sectors  is twofold: to improve protection 
programs and to increase coverage effectively.  The challenge is to identify the right 46 
 
time to phase out shorter-hours work programs, for example, as well as to achieve 
well-designed, targeted, and enforced programs.  
 
Finally, the Crisis showed that advanced economies are not very different from emerging 
markets when it comes to financial crises.  Furthermore, it has highlighted the importance of 
having a lender of last resort and fast international coordination to prevent crises from 
deepening.  Proposals to ensure that this occurs include having in place a body with global 
central bank functions when a shock hits.
96 This could lessen the need to hold international 
reserves to avert crises, freeing them to address social needs.
97
                                                           
96 Calvo (2009a) and Kapur and Subramanian (2009)). 
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (LATIN AMERICA)                
Country  ISO  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Argentina  ARG  9.2  8.5  8.7  6.8  -2.8  3.8  2.4 
Bolivia  BOL  4.4  4.8  4.6  6.1  3.3  3.6  4.1 
Brazil  BRA  3.2  4.0  5.7  5.1  -0.2  5.5  4.4 
Chile  CHL  5.6  4.6  4.7  3.2  -1.7  4.6  5.3 
Colombia  COL  5.7  6.9  7.5  2.5  0.1  2.8  3.7 
Costa Rica  CRI  5.9  8.8  7.8  2.6  -1.5  3.1  3.9 
Dominican 
Republic  DOM  9.3  10.7  8.5  5.3  2.5  3.1  4.1 
Ecuador  ECU  6.0  3.9  2.5  6.5  -0.8  2.2  2.6 
Guatemala  GTM  3.3  5.4  6.3  4.0  0.6  1.9  2.7 
Honduras  HND  6.1  6.7  6.3  4.0  -2.1  2.1  2.9 
Mexico  MEX  3.2  5.1  3.3  1.3  -6.5  4.0  3.5 
Nicaragua  NIC  4.4  3.9  3.2  3.2  -2.4  1.6  2.3 
Panama  PAN  7.2  8.5  11.5  9.2  2.4  4.0  5.5 
Peru  PER  6.8  7.7  8.9  9.8  0.9  4.9  4.8 
Paraguay  PRY  2.9  4.3  6.8  5.8  -3.4  3.2  3.9 
El Salvador  SLV  3.1  4.2  4.7  2.5  -3.1  1.7  2.4 
Uruguay  URY  6.8  4.6  7.6  8.9  1.9  3.9  3.8 
Venezuela  VEN  10.3  10.3  8.4  4.8  -3.3  -2.1  1.5 
Simple 
average    5.7  6.3  6.5  5.1  -0.9  3.0  3.5 
 
DEVELOPING 
ASIA                         
Country  ISO  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Bangladesh  BGD  6.3  6.5  6.3  6.0  5.4  5.8  6.2 
China  CHN  10.4  11.6  13.0  9.0  8.7  9.9  9.1 
Indonesia  IDN  5.7  5.5  6.3  6.1  4.5  5.7  6.1 
India  IND  9.2  9.8  9.4  7.3  6.7  7.0  8.2 
Sri Lanka  LKA  6.2  7.7  6.8  6.0  3.4  6.2  6.5 
Malaysia  MYS  5.3  5.8  6.2  4.6  -1.7  5.4  5.0 
Pakistan  PAK  7.7  6.1  5.6  2.0  2.7  3.5  4.1 
Philippines  PHL  5.0  5.3  7.1  3.8  0.9  4.0  4.5 
Thailand  THA  4.6  5.2  4.9  2.6  -2.3  4.7  4.5 
Vietnam  VNM  8.4  8.2  8.5  6.2  5.3  6.5  6.7 
Simple 
average    6.9  7.2  7.4  5.4  3.4  5.9  6.1 
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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE                   
Country  ISO  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Albania  ALB  5.8  5.5  6.3  6.8  4.2  3.5  4.6 
Bulgaria  BGR  6.2  6.3  6.2  6.0  -5.0  0.1  2.6 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  BIH  3.9  6.9  6.8  5.5  -3.4  1.3  3.1 
Estonia  EST  9.4  10.0  7.2  -3.6 
-
14.1  -0.4  3.5 
Croatia  HRV  4.2  4.7  5.5  2.4  -5.8  -0.2  2.4 
Hungary  HUN  4.0  3.9  1.2  0.6  -6.3  -0.2  2.4 
Lithuania  LTU  7.8  7.8  8.9  3.0 
-
15.0  -2.3  2.7 
Latvia  LVA  10.6  12.2  10.0  -4.6 
-




Republic of  MKD  4.1  4.0  5.9  4.9  -1.8  1.7  3.1 
Poland  POL  3.6  6.2  6.8  4.9  1.7  2.7  3.4 
Romania  ROM  4.1  7.9  6.2  7.1  -7.1  1.1  3.1 
Serbia  SRB  5.6  5.2  6.9  5.4  -2.9  1.3  3.3 
Turkey  TUR  8.4  6.9  4.7  0.9  -5.6  4.5  4.3 
                 
Simple 
average    6.0  6.7  6.3  3.0  -6.1  0.8  3.2 
 
                 
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES                
Country  ISO  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Armenia  ARM  13.9  13.2  13.7  6.8 
-
14.4  2.5  3.8 
Azerbaijan  AZE  24.3  30.6  23.4  11.6  9.3  8.1  8.5 
Belarus  BLR  9.4  10.0  8.6  10.0  0.2  1.6  2.7 
Georgia  GEO  9.6  9.4  12.3  2.1  -6.7  2.1  3.6 
Kazakhstan  KAZ  9.7  10.7  8.9  3.2  1.0  2.7  4.5 
Moldova  MDA  7.5  4.8  3.0  7.2  -7.7  2.0  3.5 
Russia  RUS  6.4  7.7  8.1  5.6  -7.9  4.5  4.6 
Turkmenistan  TKM  13.0  11.4  11.6  10.5  6.1  9.5  7.8 
Ukraine  UKR  2.7  7.3  7.9  2.1 
-
15.0  3.1  4.7 
Uzbekistan  UZB  7.0  7.3  9.5  9.0  8.1  7.3  7.5 
                 
Simple 
average    10.4  11.2  10.7  6.8  -2.7  4.3  5.1 
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ADVANCED 
ECONOMIES                      
Country  ISO  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Australia  AUS  2.759  2.84  4.049  2.354  1.3  3.1  3.4 
Austria  AUT  2.46  3.46  3.547  2.048  -3.5  1.3  1.7 
Belgium  BEL  2.17  3.015  2.599  0.969  -3  1.2  1.8 
Canada  CAN  3.019  2.854  2.531  0.414  -2.6  2.9  3.2 
Switzerland  CHE  2.641  3.63  3.605  1.78  -1.5  1.5  1.8 
Cyprus  CYP  3.949  4.142  4.444  3.57  -1.5  1  2.4 
Czech 
Republic  CZE  6.316  6.808  6.131  2.697  -4.2  1.5  2.7 
Germany  DEU  0.732  3.176  2.516  1.248  -5  1.7  1.6 
Denmark  DNK  2.445  3.344  1.647  -1.202  -5.1  1.2  1.9 
Spain  ESP  3.615  4.017  3.565  0.856  -3.6  -0.4  1.1 
Finland  FIN  2.768  4.923  4.203  1.041  -7.8  1.1  2.1 
France  FRA  1.941  2.416  2.26  0.323  -2.2  1.4  1.6 
United 
Kingdom  GBR  2.173  2.853  2.559  0.742  -5  1.4  2.3 
Greece  GRC  2.898  4.497  4.036  2.933  -1.9  -1.3  0.3 
Hong Kong 
SAR  HKG  7.082  7.02  6.38  2.365  -2.7  4.9  4.5 
Ireland  IRL  6.175  5.356  6.024  -3.036  -7.3  -1.2  2 
Israel  ISR  5.1  5.283  5.203  4  0.1  3.3  3.9 
Italy  ITA  0.656  2.036  1.564  -1.04  -4.9  0.8  1.2 
Japan  JPN  1.934  2.039  2.337  -0.705  -5.1  1.9  1.6 
Korea  KOR  3.957  5.179  5.106  2.224  0.2  4.9  4.3 
Netherlands  NLD  2.047  3.394  3.613  1.996  -4  1.3  1.6 
Norway  NOR  2.739  2.281  3.134  2.132  -1.4  2.4  2.6 
New Zealand  NZL  2.813  1.954  3.193  0.194  -1.4  2.8  3.2 
Portugal  PRT  0.91  1.368  1.872  -0.045  -2.8  0.6  1.2 
Singapore  SGP  7.307  8.352  7.766  1.149  -2  6.2  5.2 
Slovak 
Republic  SVK  6.546  8.496  10.423  6.391  -4.7  2.7  3.4 
Slovenia  SVN  4.349  5.903  6.765  3.541  -7.8  1  2.4 
Sweden  SWE  3.298  4.246  2.56  -0.155  -4.7  2.1  2.6 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China  TWN  4.161  4.799  5.703  0.058  -1.9  5  4.5 
United States  USA  3.054  2.673  2.141  0.439  -2.4  3.1  3 
                 
Simple 
average    3.400466667  4.078466667  4.0492  1.309366667 
-
3.28  1.98  2.503333333 
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MIDDLE EAST AND  
AFRICA                      
Country  ISO  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
Egypt  EGY  4.472  6.844  7.088  7.171  4.7  4.9  5.5 
Saudi Arabia  SAU  5.553  3.158  3.314  4.448  0.2  3.9  4.6 
Nigeria  NGA  5.393  6.211  6.972  5.984  5.8  5.8  6.3 
South Africa  ZAF  4.965  5.321  5.098  3.062  -1.8  2.8  3.6 
 